Students Leaving Before They Finish Their Degree

Keeping admitted students enrolled and on track to graduate, by reaching the ones who are drifting off course while there is still time to help, without labelling whole groups of students as likely to fail.

AI is suitable with conditions

Colleges hold years of records on which students persisted and graduated, and models trained on them sort students by risk well, with c-statistics of about 0.9 in research on Virginia's community colleges. It is conditional rather than strong because accurate prediction has not shown up reliably as more graduates. The largest randomised trial of analytics-enabled proactive advising, across 11 universities and more than 10,000 students, found no overall effect on graduation or persistence after six years, with a gain only at Georgia State, the one site that ran it for the full six years. Georgia State's own gains began nearly a decade before its alert system existed, and its alerts are specific triggers, such as registering for a course outside the major or a low grade in a prerequisite, that its analysts derived from years of its own grade data. The fairness record is also poor, with commercial risk scores rating Black students high risk at two to four times the rate of White students at the universities investigated, and research finding that the same models would direct fewer resources to at-risk Black students than to lower-risk White ones. A model can earn a place ranking students for an adviser's outreach when there are advisers with time to act, but specific alerts on the degree map, registration, and finances name problems an adviser can fix, and a score must never decide anything about a student on its own.

Problem Statement

A university admits students it believes can graduate, and a large share of them leave without a degree.

Some leave because the course was not what they wanted, which is not a failure, but many leave over problems the institution could have seen and helped with, such as a failed prerequisite, a wrong course choice, a small unpaid bill, or a term in which they stopped turning up.

The institution has to find those students early enough to help, with a limited number of advisers and tutors, and without treating students as likely failures because of who they are.

Business Context

Georgia State University is the case most often cited.

Ithaka S+R reports that its six-year graduation rate rose from 32% in 2003 to 54% in 2014, while the share of students eligible for Pell grants, a marker of low income, nearly doubled.

The same case study is explicit that no single programme explains the gain, which it attributes to a dozen or more modest ones.

Its advising system, GPS, holds more than 800 alerts, such as registering for a course that does not count towards the student’s major or getting a low grade in a prerequisite for it, and was introduced in 2012 alongside a consolidation of advising that more than doubled the number of advisers.

The case study points out that GPS arrived nearly a decade after the university’s improvement began.

Georgia State also gives small Panther Retention Grants to juniors and seniors who are on track academically but would otherwise be dropped from their classes under a state rule over a small unpaid balance, about 4,200 students in the first years of the programme.

Vendors sell predictive risk scores to hundreds of institutions, and The Markup reported in 2021 that more than 500 universities used the risk algorithms in EAB’s Navigate platform.

In England, the Office for Students sets a minimum continuation rate of 80% and completion rate of 75% for full-time first degree students under its condition B3, which turns retention into a regulatory matter.

Why This Is Hard

The first difficulty is that prediction is not the bottleneck.

Models sort students by risk well, but the largest randomised trial of analytics-enabled proactive advising, MAAPS, found no overall effect on graduation or persistence across 11 universities after six years.

Ithaka S+R, its evaluator, reports that most sites struggled to implement the protocol, with advisers leaving, caseloads climbing well above the intended 150 students each, students not taking up meetings, and early alert systems not ready in the first half of the trial.

The second difficulty is that the model you choose changes who you help.

Researchers using data on more than 330,000 Virginia community college students found that a complex model was only modestly more accurate than a linear regression, yet only 60% of the students the linear model rated high risk were also rated high risk by the complex one.

The third difficulty is fairness, and removing race from the inputs does not solve it.

The same research found accuracy almost unchanged without demographic inputs, and students of colour still flagged more often, because grades and other records carry the same information.

Later work by the team found that the models would leave at-risk Black students with fewer resources than lower-risk White students, partly because the available records predict Black students’ success less well, especially for new students, and that making a model more attuned to race reduced this bias in one of their models but increased it in the other.

The fourth difficulty is that a score is a label, and labels change how people see a student.

The Markup found that, at the universities it examined, Navigate rated Black students high risk at two to four times the rate of White students, showed the rating prominently in advisers’ lists, and offered predicted risk by major, which experts warned could steer students out of demanding fields.

How The Solutions Fit Together

Rules on the degree map, registration, grades in courses that predict success in the major, and balances owed are the foundation, because each alert names a specific, fixable problem and an adviser who owns it.

Engagement screening from the learning management system adds a timely prompt for a personal tutor when a student’s activity falls well below their course’s, without using demographic inputs, though its flags still fall more often on students from disadvantaged backgrounds.

A risk score can order an adviser’s outreach across a large caseload, but only as a supporting tool, built without race, measured for who it misses, and kept off the student’s record.

Course-specific chatbot outreach supports students between meetings with reminders and answers to routine questions, and hands anything personal to a person.

Implementation Considerations

Staff the response before buying the signal.

The advising successes in the evidence pair alerts with advisers who have time to act, and the MAAPS sites with high turnover and caseloads well above the intended 150 saw little effect.

Some MAAPS institutions raised take-up by placing a registration hold until the student met their adviser, which is a design choice with real costs for students and should be decided deliberately.

Record each alert, whether it led to contact, and what happened next, so the institution can tell whether its alerts lead to action and whether the action helps.

Build any model only from what was known at the time, and hold race, ethnicity, and income separately to measure who it flags and misses.

The evidence on whether to include race as an input is mixed, so this playbook keeps it out on legal and trust grounds, as Texas A&M asked its vendor to after The Markup’s reporting, and relies on measurement rather than omission for fairness.

Georgia State’s early alert models do not use race, and in MAAPS its Black students received more of the intervention and showed the largest gains, which Ithaka S+R suggests may partly explain the result.

Evaluate against a fair comparison.

The critique of Purdue’s Course Signals showed how a claim that students who took more courses using the tool were retained at higher rates can arise simply because students who stay longer take more courses.

A randomised or rotating holdout from outreach is the most reliable way to know whether a model’s ranking beats the advisers’ own judgement.

ROI Considerations

The return is counted in students who stay, and for the institution in tuition and funding retained, against the cost of advisers and systems.

Bird and colleagues cite one estimate that predictive analytics cost an institution around $300,000 a year, and their analysis suggests most of the accuracy is available from simpler models.

The larger costs are usually staff, because outreach without capacity does not change outcomes.

Some of the best returns in the evidence are administrative, such as Georgia State’s retention grants, which it started in 2011 after finding that more than 1,000 students on track to graduate were being dropped each semester, some over small balances, where the fix was known and needed no prediction.

Security, Privacy, and Regulation

Student records, financial aid, and any risk score derived from them are personal data, and some of it, such as disability and ethnicity, is special category data under UK and EU law.

In the United States, FERPA allows an institution to share education records with a vendor that performs an institutional function only where the vendor is under the institution’s direct control over how the records are used and maintained.

Under the EU AI Act, Annex III lists as high-risk the AI systems used to determine admission or assign students to institutions, to evaluate learning outcomes including when they steer a student’s learning, to assess the level of education a student can access, and to monitor students during tests.

A dropout risk score is not named in that list, but a model whose output steers a student’s course or programme choices could fall within it, which is a judgement each institution should take advice on.

Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, the Digital Omnibus on AI, set the obligations for Annex III systems to apply from 2 December 2027.

In England, the Office for Students’ condition B3 thresholds make continuation and completion regulated outcomes, which raises the pressure to act on retention but does not make any particular method required.

Where The Evidence Disagrees

Georgia State’s results and MAAPS disagree about whether analytics-enabled advising works in general.

Georgia State reports large gains, and in MAAPS its students in the treatment group graduated at a rate seven percentage points higher than the control group, with Black students fifteen points higher, yet across all 11 universities the effect was not significant, and at one site persistence was five points lower.

Wisconsin’s dropout early warning system for school students shows that a score can sort well and still be a poor label.

The Berkeley study of it found that it sorted students accurately, with an AUC of 0.80, yet The Markup reported that it was wrong nearly three quarters of the time when it predicted a student would not graduate on time, at a threshold set to cast a wide net.

The Markup reported the study as finding no effect on graduation, while the study itself estimated a possible single-digit gain that it could not distinguish from no effect, and warned that targeting by the score could de-prioritise marginalised students.

The same study argues that targeting interventions by the school or community a student is in could be as efficient as individual risk scores, which questions whether individual scores are needed at all.

Research on Georgia State’s advisers also questions the weight put on the score, finding that two out of three advising interventions in the trial were plausibly well targeted using context no model held, which credits human judgement.

Symptoms

Root causes

Business impact

Traditional approaches

Solution approaches

Each of these is written for this problem specifically, not borrowed from a generic catalogue.

Recommendation

Start with the rules the institution already understands, alerts when a student registers off their degree map, earns a low grade in a course that predicts success in their major, does not register for next term, or is about to be dropped for a small balance, each routed to a named adviser with time to act and a record of what was done. Fix the administrative causes those alerts reveal, such as dropping students over small balances. Add engagement signals from the learning management system as a prompt for a personal tutor, not as a judgement on the student. Use a risk score only to order an adviser's outreach, built without race and measured for who it misses by group, and never show it as a label on the student's record, use it in a conversation about changing major, or use it to decide admission, aid, or whether a student should leave. Advisers, tutors, and faculty make every decision about a student.

Data requirements

Student information system records high sensitivity
Enrolment status, registered courses each term, major and declared degree programme, term and cumulative GPA, credits attempted and earned, and holds, kept as they were each term so a model only learns from what was known at the time.
Degree maps and course requirements low sensitivity
The courses each programme requires, in the order and by the term they should be taken, and the courses whose grades are known to predict success in that programme.
Learning management system activity medium sensitivity
Logins, assignment submissions, quiz attempts, and content views per course and week, and where used, attendance and library or building access, compared with the course cohort rather than an absolute standard.
Student accounts and financial aid high sensitivity
Balances owed, payment plans, aid awarded and its conditions, and holds that would block registration or drop the student from classes.
Advising and intervention records high sensitivity
Each alert raised, who raised it, who it was routed to, whether the student was contacted and met, what was done, and the student's later enrolment, needed to tell whether alerts lead to action and whether action helps.
Protected characteristics for fairness monitoring high sensitivity
Race and ethnicity, sex, disability, first-generation status, and Pell or equivalent low-income status, held separately from any model's inputs and used only to measure who is flagged, contacted, and retained by group.

Evaluation metrics

Human oversight

An academic adviser or personal tutor decides whether and how to contact a student and what to recommend, using the alert as a prompt alongside what they know of the student. No change of major, withdrawal, probation, financial decision, or admission decision is ever taken because of a risk score. Faculty decide grades and academic standing. The student success leadership owns any predictive model, reviews who it flags and misses by group at least once a year, and stops it if outreach based on it does not beat outreach without it.

Common pitfalls

When not to use AI

Sources

Practitioners

Research

Case studies

Regulation and guidance

Agent context

A distilled brief for an AI agent or an engineer scoping this work. It carries the constraints and pitfalls that change an implementation decision, not the whole page.

Get the agent context as Markdown

Objective

Raise the share of admitted students who continue and graduate by finding students who are going off track early enough for an adviser or tutor to help, using alerts tied to specific causes first and any risk model only to order outreach, without labelling students by who they are.

Constraints

Inputs

Outputs

Success criteria

Last updated 2026-10-06